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This paper examines the system of ‘accrual output budgeting’ which was introduced by most 
Australian governments at the end of the 1990s.  It explains the key features of the system, 
and its roots in ‘market’ models.  Key difficulties with the model are identified: including the 
unsuitability of many publicly-funded outputs to funding on a price-per-unit-of-output basis 
and the information problems which arise in determining the ‘efficient’ price of outputs. 
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As part of a broader ‘new public management’ reform agenda, public budgeting in Australia 
has in recent years been reconfigured along the lines of a new budgeting system known as 
‘accrual output budgeting’ (AOB).  The essence of AOB is the attempt to transform public 
budgeting into a process whereby government purchases outputs
1 from its departments, under 
circumstances intended to emulate the competitive market.  The system was derived from the 
New Zealand ‘contract’ budgeting system (NZT 1996; Mascerenhas 1996; Robinson 2000), 
which was itself adapted from the British National Health System (NHS) ‘internal market’ 
model introduced in the early 1990s (Culyer, Maynard and Posnett 1992; Bartlett and 
Harrison 1993). 
 
AOB first came into full operation in 1998, in the states of Victoria and Western Australia 
(VDTF 1997a; WAT 1996a, 1996b).  The Commonwealth (ie national) government and most 
other state governments achieved this position the following year (DOFA 1998,1999a; 
SADTF 1998a, 1998b; QT 1997a).  There are differences between the AOB systems adopted 
in the various Australian jurisdictions, but there is also a great degree of commonality.  To 
date, the major (partial) abstainer is the government of the most populous state, New South 
Wales. 
 
Accrual Output Budgeting ‘purchase’ arrangements 
 
As noted above, the proximate origins of AOB may be traced back to ‘internal market’ model 
introduced into British National Health Service in the early 1990s.  The NHS internal market 
model, which itself drew on earlier US ‘prospective payment’ systems of health finance, 
represented an attempt to place the provision of one specific type of public-funded service on 
a market footing.  Since the early 1990s, Governments in many countries have introduced a 
variety of other service-specific internal market models, and some of these appear to have 
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worked well.  A distinctive feature of AOB is that it aspires to apply the internal market 
model to all public-funded services.   
 
Internal markets, including AOB, draw their inspiration from the ‘pure market’ model of 
purchase transactions in competitive markets.   A pure market purchase transaction involves a 
binding agreement between independent parties for the supply of clearly pre-specified goods 
or services (‘outputs’) at a pre-agreed price (OECD 1993).  It requires that actual output 
delivery be unambiguously measurable, and that payment be made to the supplier only for 
outputs actually delivered.  Pure market transactions possess the key characteristics of what 
Williamson (1985) refers to as ‘classical’ contracting.  The feasibility of such contracting is a 
necessary condition for the emergence of textbook-style pure competition, which involves 
vigorous price-based competition for standardised outputs.  In the presence of such 
competition, the price of outputs is wholly determined by the market, and in the short run 
need bear no relationship to the cost structure of any particular supplier firm.  Indeed, there is 
a tendency for prices to reflect the efficient costs of production (ie long run minimum average 
cost).  If a particular supplier is inefficient, it can expect to shoulder the full consequences of 
that inefficiency.  There is no capacity for it to share the pain with purchasers. 
 
Consistent with the pure market model, under AOB departments are supposedly funded via 
what is considered to be a ‘price’ paid for their outputs.  The aim was that funding would be 
set as a function of output quantities.  In the simplest form of this idea, funding would be 
determined by multiplying a price-per-unit-of-output by the planned quantity of the output 
concerned (VDTF, 1997b: 18).  Such an approach would place budgeting on precisely the 
same basis as a simple market transaction (such as the placement of an order for off-the shelf 
products and known prices from, say, a stationery supplier).  A less simplistic variant of the 
same idea was that a per-unit price would be paid to cover the variable costs of outputs, with 
‘base’ funding provided to cover fixed costs.  This approach has been pursued at the 
Commonwealth level, through ‘purchasing agreements’  negotiated by the Department of 
Finance and Administration and each department. 
 
A further reflection of the pure market model has been the distinction between output ‘prices’ 
and output costs.  Most Australian AOB jurisdictions announced early on that the ‘price’ paid 
to departments for outputs would, after a transitional period in which it is set on the basis of 
departmental costs, be based on the efficient (as opposed to the actual) cost of production.  
This would be determined by market or ‘benchmarked’ prices (eg DOFA1999b, 27; VDTF 
1999c, 9, 11; SA 1999, 3; QT 1998a, 23).  Also reflecting the competitive market model, 
official AOB documentation in most jurisdictions is full of allusions to the goal of ‘paying’ 
departments only for actual outputs delivered (what we might call ‘payment for results’).  
However, as discussed below, only one jurisdiction has made an attempt to actually put this 
problematic notion into practice. 
 
A key implication of the price/cost distinction is that, in principle, it makes profit measures a 
business-style performance measure for budget-dependent government agencies.  Part of the 
AOB package has been the introduction of full accrual accounting into the budget sector, and 
this has of course included the production of operating statements.  However, the type of 
operating statements employed reflects not simply accrual principles, but also the market 
model.  The operating statements employed in AOB jurisdictions treat the ‘price’ paid for 
departmental outputs via the budget as revenue earned by the department.  The implication of 
this is that if ‘price’ is set to reflect efficient cost, and a department is unable to produce the   3
output concerned at efficient cost, it will make a loss on the production of that output.  Just as 
in the case of a private sector firm operating in a competitive market, inefficiency will 
therefore show up in the financial bottom line (see, eg QT 1998b, 12).  This approach also 
explains why many of the Australian AOB jurisdictions require departments to report output 
operating statements (supposedly showing profit/loss on specific product lines) as well as an 
an overall departmental operating statement. 
 
The contrast between this and the traditional view of public budgeting is marked.  
Traditionally, budget  funding was not considered to be revenue earned by departments.  
Departmental ‘revenue’ was taken to refer only to user-charge revenue received by the 
department from the public.  It followed from this view that departments were inherently loss-
making.  In Australia, this traditional (and arguably well-founded) approach is reflected in the 
different approach taken by the New South Wales Government (which, as noted earlier, has 
not adopted AOB) to accrual financial reporting.  In NSW budget documentation, agency 
budget funding is not treated as revenue.  User-charge revenue is.  As a consequence, the 
‘bottom line’ of NSW departmental budgeted operating statement is not a profit/loss figure, 
but rather a ‘net cost of service’ figure which represents the cost to the budget of departmental 
service-provision. 
 
AOB aims to improve performance not merely through increased clarity and accountability, 
but by facilitating maximum competition for the supply of tax-financed outputs.  As the 
Commonwealth Department of Finance puts it, AOB ‘complements the use of competitive 
tendering and contracting in the public sector’ (DOFA 1998, vii).  AOB-generated 
information on the unit ‘full’ costs of outputs is seen as particularly important in this context.  
It is for this reason that the Victorian Treasury’s AOB output costing guidelines, for example, 
stipulate that ‘where products or services are contestable in nature, unit costs should always 
be provided’ (VDTF 1997b, 21). 
 
The market model and the emphasis upon departmental accountability for outputs delivered 
have led to important changes to appropriations arrangements.  Prior to AOB, Australian 
Parliaments appropriated funds to departments in two categories: current and capital 
expenditure.  No distinction was made between, on the one hand, expenditure on goods and 
services for which departments were responsible (and for which they could therefore be held 
accountable) and, on the other hand, expenditure which was beyond departmental control 
(examples of which include interest on government debt, and welfare entitlement expenditure 
pursuant to standing appropriation).  Under AOB, however, this distinction becomes crucial 
(DOFA 1998, 15).  As a consequence, Australian Parliaments now appropriate funds to each 
department
2 in three categories: payments for departmental outputs (‘controlled’ outputs); 
payments for items not under departmental control (‘administered’ items); and appropriations 
to fund new capital funds. 
 
As a reflection of the business model and specifically of the aim to transform departmental 
operating statement into business-style performance measures, the ‘payment for departmental 
outputs’ appropriation is now an accrual appropriation. This means that departments are 
required to cover non-cash costs (eg depreciation, accumulating liabilities to employees) as 
well as the cash costs of their outputs from this appropriation
3. 
 
   4
AOB is, of course, a system of performance budgeting.  The term ‘performance budgeting’ 
refers to systems which explicitly link budgetary resource allocations with the results (outputs 
or perhaps outcomes) which government agencies are expected to achieve with those 
resources, as a means of promoting better performance in service delivery (OECD, 1995; 
Shand, 1998).  The starting point for most contemporary forms of performance budgeting, 
AOB included, is program budgeting, the original aspiration of which was to base budgeting 
upon outputs.  Program budgeting was standard public budgeting practice throughout 
Australia prior to the arrival of AOB, having been adopted in the 1980s.  AOB incorporates 
much of the former program budgeting framework.  Thus, under AOB the annual government 
budget documentation reports the breakdown of funds allocated to broad output groups within 
each Department, very much like the former ‘programs’
4.  These output groups are groups of 
related outputs￿where ‘related’ often means that they aim at delivering the same type of 
outcome
5.  Each output group is, in turn, comprised of a number of less aggregated output 
groups, like the former ‘sub-programs’. 
 
The budgetary allocations of funding to output groups are not binding.  Instead, parliamentary 
appropriations for departmental outputs are ‘global’, just as they were under the former 
program budgeting regime
6.  In other words, they specify for each department one aggregate 
sum to cover all the outputs for which the department is responsible.  This arrangement 
reflects a consensus that it is important to retain flexibility to reallocate funds between 
outputs during the year in  response to changing demand or unanticipated events.  The 
intention is, however, that this flexibility should in no way compromise the principle of 
accountability for the delivery of specified outputs, irrespective of whether there is some 
variation in the output deliverables during the year. 
 
Although AOB has its roots in program budgeting, it is clearly a very different system.  
Essentially, it attempts to build a market-type superstructure upon program budgeting 
foundations (WAT 1996a, 2).  In this respect, it differs considerably from many other forms 
of performance budgeting which operate around the world today.  Most contemporary forms 
of performance budgeting seek to go beyond program budgeting in tightening up the linkage 
between results and funding, and in nearly all cases this involves the stipulation of explicit 
output/outcome targets linked to budget funding.  However, the other versions of 
performance budgeting do not pretend to set budget allocations by multiplying output ‘prices’ 
by quantities, nor do they generally regard agency profit results as a key performance 
measures.  To take one US example, in the State of Florida under a system of ‘performance-
based program budgeting’ the annual budget acts passed by the legislature include for each 
agency a set of output and outcome targets (Florida Office of Program Policy Analysis and 
Government Accountability, 2000).  In the United Kingdom, there has developed since 1998 
a system of Public Service Agreements and Service Delivery Agreements between t he 
Government and agencies linked to the budget (HM Government, 2000).  In Australia, the 
only state not to have adopted accrual output budgeting—New South Wales—has over recent 
years been progressively introducing a system of Service Resource Allocation Agreements 
between agencies and executive government (NSW Treasury, 2000).  
 
Government’s ‘ownership interest’ 
 
The idea that Government should conduct arms-length purchase transactions with its 
departments in the same manner as it might with private providers of outsourced outputs is a 
problematic one, not least because Government ‘owns’ the former.  The New Zealand system   5
attempted to resolve this by dichotomisation of the purchaser and ownership functions of 
Government, although arguably without great success (Schick 1996).  Australian AOB has 
picked up the same theme (eg VDTF 1998a, 300).  The underlying idea is that the purchase 
relationship should be complemented by a separate ownership relationship designed to 
emulate the relationship between shareholders and firms in the private sector. 
 
Consistent with this, capital appropriations to departments have now been re-labelled as 
‘equity injections’
7.  Finance ministries also assert that, in addition to equity injections, 
departments may now, just like private corporations, have access to two main alternative 
capital funding sources.  The first of these is so-called ‘depreciation-based’ capital funding, 
which in most Australian jurisdictions is conceptualised as a drawing down of accumulated 
depreciation reserves.  The other is what has been referred to as the ‘rearrangement of the 
asset structure’￿accounting jargon for funding derived from departmental asset sales 
(Robinson, 2002a).  Implicit in both of these alternative capital funding sources is the 
problematic notion that departments might enjoy a considerable measure of the freedom 
which private sector firms enjoy in such funding decisions. 
 
So-called ‘capital charging’ has been introduced in most, but not all, Australian AOB system 
(eg DOFA 1999c; VDTF 1998b)
8.   Clearly, in a budgeting system supposedly based upon 
output prices, it is logical to treat the opportunity cost of capital as a cost to be taken into 
account in price-setting.  Accordingly, the State governments which impose capital charges 
treat it as an ‘above the line’ expense in operating statements, as is done elsewhere in the 
world where capital charging in employed.  However, the Commonwealth Government takes 
a different approach, treating the capital charge as a ‘below the line’ (after profit) entry, 
conceptualising the payment by agencies of the capital charge as the equivalent of a profit 
dividend paid to shareholders. 
 
Problems of the pure market model 
 
The AOB attempt to apply ‘pure market’ principles to public budgeting represents not only its 
most distinctive, but also its most problematic, aspect. 
 
The core ‘market’ idea that funding should be determined by the payment of a specific price-
per-unit for each output type is perhaps relatively unproblematic when applied to relatively 
homogeneous (standardised) outputs.  Unfortunately, however, many publicly-provided 
services are highly heterogeneous in nature, and are quite unsuited to funding via a fixed 
price-per-unit.  ‘Heterogeneity’ refers to differences in the level of services, and therefore in 
costs per unit of output, which arise from differences in client or case characteristics between 
units of the ‘same’ type of output.  Consider the example of assistance/intervention provided 
in cases of children perceived to be ‘at risk’ of abuse.  The type and extent of activity 
associated with such cases varies considerably depending, amongst other things, upon the 
seriousness of any abuse which has already taken place and the circumstances of the family.  
Some cases may involve extensive assistance, while others may require much less state 
involvement.  When outputs are characterised by substantial heterogeneity￿and this is often 
the case in the public sector￿funding via the payment of a fixed amount per output can be 
entirely inappropriate, and may lead to highly undesirable consequences. 
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Nor is this the only reason why the principle of funding on a per-unit-price basis cannot be 
applied across the board in the public sector.  There are also many ‘contingent capacity’ 
services, where the need to maintain a capacity to provide a service rapidly in response to 
unpredictable demand means that funding must be based not on output quantity produced, but 
on the maintenance of a desired service-delivery capacity.  The armed services, emergency 
services, and emergency departments of hospitals are just a few examples of such services. 
 
In this respect, it can be argued that AOB’s central problem lies precisely in the scale of its 
ambition.  Although their are strong grounds for believing that service-specific internal 
market models can and do work well in respect to certain types of outputs (example of which 
are acute inpatient medical services and prisons).  Internal markets are more likely to work in 
relation to services which are relatively standardised.  The example of output-based hospital 
funding models arguably suggests that they may also work for outputs which display 
moderate degrees of heterogeneity but which are produced in large volumes by multiple 
producers.  However, the proposition that they can provide a general template for all 
government-financed services is unconvincing. 
 
Given these realities, it is hardly surprising that theory and the principle of output-based 
funding under AOB tend to diverge somewhat.  Research interviews suggest that, 
notwithstanding the way the system is supposed to operate, in most Australian States budget 
allocations are in practice almost never decided even in part by multiplying planned output 
quantity by output prices. 
 
The Commonwealth government has made a more serious and attempt to apply the principle 
of output-based funding through so-called ‘purchase agreements’ which are negotiated 
between each agency and the Department of Finance and Administration (DOFA).  Under 
these agreements, a significant portion of the funding provided to agencies comes through 
per-unit ‘prices’ paid for a range of output-types.  Alongside this output-price funding, there 
is also a large component of ‘base’ funding provided, which is not an explicit function of 
output quantities.  However, under this system the ‘base’ funding provided does not by any 
means represent only funding for fixed costs.  Many of the outputs produced by 
Commonwealth agencies are not funded, even in part, through per-unit ‘prices’, and funding 
for both variable and fixed costs associated with these outputs is in effect included in the base 
funding components of agency funding.  Even then, many of the outputs covered by per-unit 
prices in the purchasing agreements are quite heterogeneous, and this is the source of many 
practical difficulties. 
 
Similarly, the ambition of setting prices based upon market or benchmarked prices is highly 
problematic.  Market price comparators are in very many case simply not available.  
Benchmarking, on the other hand, is costly and does not necessarily provide robust 
information on the ‘shadow’ market price.  It is therefore unsurprising that progress in 
separating output ‘prices’ from costs appears to be slow (Vertigan, 1999). 
 
As mentioned earlier, there are frequent references to the principle of ‘payments by results’ in 
the official literature expounding the AOB system.  Putting this principle into practice is, 
however, no easy matter.  The principle was never implemented in New Zealand, 
notwithstanding some enthusiasm on the part of the NZ finance ministry (NZT 1996, 38).  In 
Australia, the same is true in most states.  Only in the state of Victoria has there been a recent 
attempt to make payment by results a reality.  Under the Victorian system, when a department   7
initially draws upon appropriated funds in order to meet the costs of producing outputs, the 
funds provided to it are considered to be an advance of funds.  The department then ‘invoices’ 
Treasury on a quarterly basis for the outputs it has delivered.  The theory was that, depending 
upon how fully the department has delivered on its required outputs, it will be permitted to 
formally recognise as revenue in its accounts some or all of the funds which have been 
provided to it.  If the department were to less than the quantity (or quality) of output ‘agreed’ 
in the budget, it would record an ‘operating deficit’ in its accounts, because the revenue it was 
permitted to recognise would be less than the expenses it had incurred (VDTF 1998a, 302-3). 
 
Whatever the theory in Victoria, the system does not appear to have worked in practice.  
There has to date been no instance of Victorian departments being "paid" revenue less than its 
expenses as a consequence of adjudged under-performance.  Political considerations are part 
of the explanation: individual ministers have successfully fought off certain attempts by 
Treasury to inflict such paper losses upon departments which it perceived as under-
performing.  However, the more fundamental problem is the inherent ambiguities of output 
measurement, particularly in the presence of significant heterogeneity. 
 
Benefits of Accrual Output Budgeting 
 
The above analysis suggests that the ‘market’ principle of funding based on output prices can 
only be selectively applied in the public sector.  If this is the case, then it may well turn out 
that the approach is of considerable benefit when applied to more standardised, mass 
produced outputs.  However, the system is too new to permit firm conclusions to be drawn in 
this respect. 
 
Setting aside the distinctive ‘market’ aspects of AOB, the system has had certain other clear 
benefits.  It has led to a renewed effort to improve and extend performance measures and 
indicators.  Considerable work is being undertaken to articulate the linkages between outputs 
and outcomes, and strategy.  Moreover, it has been associated with a major drive to shift 
public sector accounting in Australia onto an accrual basis: a step which arguably has many 




The application of market purchase principles across the board to public budgeting seems 
profoundly problematic.  The AOB objective of funding outputs generally via the payment of 
output prices is not a realistic one, although it is clearly capable of useful application on a 
selective basis.  This implies that the AOB objective of making the operating result a key 
performance measure for government departments, in the way it is for businesses, is not a 
realistic one.  Given this, one might predict that over time the market paraphernalia of AOB 
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1 In Australia, as in New Zealand, ‘outputs’ have been defined to include not only services provided to the 
community, but also services (such as policy advice) which is provided by departments to ministers or to other 
elements of the political leadership (Cabinet, Parliament etc).  There is some debate about whether inter-
agency intermediate services might sometimes be considered to be outputs. 
2  Or, more accurately, to each ministerial portfolio. 
3  A full explanation and evaluation of the AOB appropriations may be found in M Robinson, ‘Financial Control 
in Australian Government Budgeting’, Public Budgeting and Finance, 22 (1), 2002. 
4  Output groups, moreover, are being defined in such a way as to more truly reflect the concept of an output 
than had been the case under Australian program budgeting practice.  Departments have, for example, rarely 
been permitted to use ‘corporate services’ as an output group, although corporate services programs were 
common under program budgeting. 
 
5  The Commonwealth refers to ‘Outcomes’ rather than output groups, but the meaning is the same. 
6  The Commonwealth submits appropriations to Parliament in a form grouped into ‘outcomes’.  However, this 
allocation is not binding, and is purely for informational purposes (DOFA, 1998: 33; 1999c). 
7 The Commonwealth differs from the states in now making loans to departments as well as equity injections 
(DOFA, 1998: 33; 1999c). 
8 Capital charging (Heald and Scott 1995; Heald 1996; Robinson 1998) is a private-sector idea the first 
application of which to the public sector appears to have been the British NHS.  New Zealand subsequently 
extended capital charging to the whole budget sector.  The idea is that, in addition to depreciation, a type of 
‘interest’ charge is levied upon departments for the use of the capital which they have tied up, particularly in 
physical assets.  Because it means that capital is longer provided ‘free’, capital charging is thought by its 
proponents to reduce wasteful capital expenditure and to encourage the identification and sale of surplus 
assets.  The rate at which the capital charge is set is supposed to reflect the opportunity cost of capital 
provided to Departments.  In thus providing a ‘return on the equity provided by the Government’ (DOFA 
1999a, 2), it is considered to mimic private sector shareholders expectations that enterprises to which they 
provide capital should earn at least a ‘normal’ rate of return. 